Imperfect attention and menu evaluation by Manzini, Paola & Mariotti, Marco
S
c
h
o
o
l
o
f
E
c
o
n
o
m
ic
s
&
F
in
a
n
c
e
D
is
c
u
s
s
io
n
P
a
p
e
r
sSchool of Economics & FinanceDiscussion Paper Series
issn 0962-4031
http://ideas.repec.org/s/san/wpecon.html
info: econ@st-andrews.ac.uk
Imperfect Attention and Menu
Evaluation
Paola Manzini and Marco Mariotti
School of Economics and Finance Discussion Paper No. 1319
21 Oct 2013 (revised 24 Aug 2014)
JEL Classification: D01
Keywords: bounded rationality, stochastic choice
Imperfect Attention and Menu Evaluation
Paola Manzini Marco Mariotti†
This version: August 2014
Abstract
We model the choice behaviour of an agent who is vNM rational but imper-
fectly attentive. We define inattention axiomatically through preference overmenus
and endowed alternatives: an agent is inattentive if it is better to be endowed with
an alternative a than to be allowed to pick a from a menu in which a is is the best
alternative. This property and vNM rationality imply that the agent notices each
alternative with a given menu-dependent probability (attention parameter) and
maximises a menu independent and deterministic utility function over the alterna-
tives he notices. Preference for flexibility restricts the model to menu independent
attention parameters as in Manzini and Mariotti [26]. Our theory explains anom-
alies (e.g. the attraction and compromise effect) that Random Utility Maximisation
cannot accommodate.
J.E.L. codes: D0.
Keywords: bounded rationality, stochastic choice
We are grateful to Yorgos Gerasimou, Pietro Ortoleva, Kemal Ozbek and Dan Sasaki for insightful
comments, to various seminar audiences (notably attendees at BRIC2014 in Barcelona), and to ESRC for
financial support through grant ES/J012513/1.
†Both authors at School of Economics and Finance, University of St. Andrews, Castlecliffe, The
Scores, St. Andrews KY16 9AL, Scotland, U.K. (e-mail Manzini: paola.manzini@st-andrews.ac.uk; e-
mail Mariotti: marco.mariotti@st-andrews.ac.uk).
1
1 Introduction
In this paper we propose a model of choice with imperfect attention and a method
to build such a model. By ‘imperfect attention’ we mean any cognitive shortcoming
or bias that causes the agent to ignore, with some probability, some of the available
options of choice.
For example, you have to choose a new computer, or a new house in a large city, or
you are planning a complex trip. You do not examine, or even notice, all the available
options. Instead, you focus your attention on a subset of them, your consideration set. In
general, this type of attention failure is likely when the available options are numerous
(in the case of computers and houses, several hundreds), or complex, or they change
frequently (due e.g. to technological change), or are difficult to store in memory. As
an extreme but relevant example of this last case - to which we return later - think of
having to take a daily pill. Here the option set on any given day consists of exactly one
element, and an attention failure means failing to take that option.
How should imperfect attention be modeled? Existing axiomatic work (such as
Brady and Rehbeck [5], Caplin and Dean [6], Echenique, Saito and Tserenjigmid [11],
Manzini and Mariotti [26] and Masatlioglu et al. [27]) extends in various ways classical
revealed preference analysis by focusing directly on properties of a choice procedure
that maps menus into choice data (where choice data may be highly non-standard
in that they incorporate richer information than crude choices, as in Caplin and Dean
[6]). Here we explore a different methodology. We infer the characteristics of the choice
procedure indirectly, through comparisons between the values of different choice situ-
ations to an imperfectly attentive decision maker. The implied choice procedure gen-
eralises the model in Manzini and Mariotti [26] in a useful direction, addressing some
prominent anomalies such as the attraction and compromise effects.
The key idea for our definition of imperfect attention is to compare the values of
two types of situations:
 choosing from menus of alternatives
 being endowedwith an alternative.
2
An endowed alternative is one that the agent simply ‘has’ or ‘is given’, without
going through a process of choice. For an agent who is fully attentive and preference
maximising there is no difference between being endowed with an alternative a and
choosing from a menu x in which a is its best alternative. But if the agent may fail to
consider a because of a lapse of attention, there is a gap between the value x and the
value of a. This agent must be strictly better off in the situation in which he is endowed
with a than in the situation in which he can pick a from x.
An endowed alternative could have, for example, the nature of a default option.
Imagine someone needing a health insurance scheme. Compare two situations: (A)
He is automatically enrolled in a plan a by the public authority; (B) he chooses from
the market, where a is available. An imperfectly attentive agent is one who is strictly
better off in A than in B, if plan a happens to be the best option. Having to take a
daily tablet offers a second example: if you are better off with a transdermal delivery
implant, then you suffer from imperfect attention by our definition.
This is a deliberately minimal and ‘reduced form’ definition of imperfect attention,
which does not commit to any specific hypothesis on what causes attention to be im-
perfect, or on how the agent builds a consideration set. It ignores the details of any un-
derlying information processing mechanism or search strategy. It ignores the specific
features of the alternatives that may render them more or less salient. Yet it captures
a core aspect of imperfect attention that is common to many of its possible causes. In
fact, it is hard to deny that whatever it is that makes attention imperfect, it has precisely
the effect of making the agent worse off when choosing from a menu than he would
be by being endowed with the optimal option in that menu (below we also explain
why such a preference on our domain permits a distinction from other psychological
phenomena, such as temptation).
We study inattentive preferences over lotteries that are otherwise von Neumann
Morgenstern (henceforth vNM) rational. We show that the implied choices frommenus
can then be represented as the outcome of deterministic, menu-independent utility
maximisation over a stochastic consideration set. Moreover, we pin down four distinc-
tive aspects of the stochastic process that generates the consideration set:
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 Menu dependence in consideration: the probability distribution over consideration
sets changes from menu to menu.
 Stochastic independence in consideration: the probability of considering any group
of alternatives in a menu is the product of the probabilities of considering each of
those alternatives individually.
 Monotonicity in consideration: the probability of considering an alternative in a
menu is weakly decreasing with respect to the addition of a top alternative to the
menu.
 Menu independence in consideration is equivalent to a form of preference for flexibility
(the agent is better off with larger menus).
More in detail, we posit a preference ranking % of (riskless) endowed alternatives
a, menus x (finite sets of alternatives), and non-trivial lotteries with as and xs as conse-
quences. The relation % expresses ordinal comparisons of how well off the agent is in
different situations.1 Thus, we consider statements such as ‘it is better to choose from
menu x rather than from menu y’; or ‘it is better to choose from menu x than being
endowed with alternative a’; or ‘it is better to have a fifty-fifty chance of choosing from
menu x or being endowed with a, than being endowed with b’. Notably, we do not
consider ranking menus of lotteries, just lotteries of menus.2
We introduce the axiom of Imperfect Attention: a  x for any menu x that contains
only alternatives not better than a (possibly including a itself). This accounts for the
possibility of neglecting a (or any alternative to which a is indifferent) when choosing
from x to end up with some b 2 x for which a  b. Observe how this axiom (and
the conceptual device of endowed alternatives) helps to distinguish inattention from
1Let us assume for the moment that % is either an ‘objective’, normative betterness ranking, or (if
a choice-based interpretation of % is desired) the preference of an entity whose interests are entirely
aligned with those of the agent (such as a parent or a benevolent planner). Interpreting % as the pref-
erence over menus of the same individual that makes the choice from menus presents some conceptual
difficulties. We address this issue in section 5.
2In this respect the task of ranking objects is easier than in much of the recent menu choice literature
that extends Kreps [22]. See Ortoleva [32] for a recent exception.
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temptation. While for non-singleton menus x the preference a  x, with a being the top
alternative in x, could be the result of being tempted by inferior alternatives in x, this
cannot be the case when x = fag. But if you are inattentive you can for example fail to
take the pill, so that a  fag. Similarly, neither can thought aversion (Ortoleva [32]) or
similarity mistakes (Payro and Ülkü [33]) explain this type of strict preference, since fag
entails no such mistakes or thinking costs.
If% is also vNM, Imperfect Attention leads to an evaluation of menus in which the
implied choice from menus is stochastic. Each alternative a in menu x is considered
with a menu-dependent probability α (a, x) (the attention parameter), and is evaluated
by a menu-independent utility value u (a). Then the agent picks one of the highest
utility alternatives among those which he has considered. For example, if there are
three alternatives a, b and c with u (a) > u (b) = u (c) the value of menu x = fa, b, cg
is
u (x) = α (a, x) u (a)
+ (1  α (a, x)) (1  (1  α (b, x)) (1  α (c, x))) u (b)
+ (1  α (a, x)) (1  α (b, x)) (1  α (c, x)) u (?)
where u (?) is the utility of a default alternative or outside option which is consumed
if nothing is considered (e.g. keeping your old computer, abstaining from voting, walk-
ing out of the shop).3 Then the implicit choice from x is determined either by consider-
ing a (with the probability given by the attention parameter) and choosing it irrespec-
tive of whatever else is considered; or missing a and picking one of b or c if considered;
or missing everything in x and getting the default alternative. In our main representa-
tion (theorem 1) the menu-dependence of the attention parameters is limited. Specifi-
cally, it cannot be the case in the above example that α (b, fa, b, cg) > α (b, fb, cg): that
is, adding a better alternative to a menu cannot increase the attention paid to the ex-
3Other papers have considered the possibility of ‘not choosing’. For the deterministic case, see e.g.
Clark [8] and more recently Gerasimou [16]. For the stochastic case, see e.g. Corbin and Marley [9]. In
the empirical IO literature using discrete choice models, it is also standad to introduce an outside option
to allow for the possibility that the data do not contain all brands or models that have a positive market
share (see e.g. Sovinsky Goeree [39]).
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isting alternatives (as we explain later, this is a natural feature when attention derives
from some types of search process).
In section 4 we relate the model to preference for flexibility. We introduce the axiom of
Top Expansion, which says that adding a top alternative to a menu must make the agent
better off. Top Expansion has sharp implications for the representation: it is equivalent
to the property that the attention parameters can be taken to be menu independent
(theorem 2). Moreover, since Top expansion is immediately seen to be equivalent to
a strict version of Kreps’ [22] preference for flexibility, the result also shines new light
on a standard axiom of the menu preference literature: in our setting strict preference
for flexibility is not related to unforeseen contingencies but rather to a property of
attention.
Finally, we show in section 6 that the choice model we describe handles in a simple
way observed anomalies of choice involving failures of Regularity (the property that
the introduction of new alternatives in a menu reduces the probability of choosing
already existing alternatives).
2 The Model
Let X be a finite set of alternatives, denoted a, b, c, ... and let X =2X. An element x 2 X
is called a menu.
Let ∆ (X [ X ) be the set of lotteries on X [ X . To simplify notation we identify the
degenerate lotteries in ∆ (X [ X ) with elements of X [ X .
As explained, the interpretation of an a 2 X is that the agent is endowed with a,
without having to pick it from a menu, while an x 2 X is interpreted as the situation
in which the agent has to choose an element from x. Finally, a non-degenerate element
of ∆ (X [ X ) is interpreted as a risky situation in which the agent either will have to
pick an element from some menu or will be endowed with some alternative, with the
identity of the menu or the alternative to be determined probabilistically.
A preference is a binary relation % on ∆ (X [ X ), where g0 % g for any g, g0 2
∆ (X [ X ), interpreted as the agent being better off when facing situation g0 than when
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facing situation g.
We consider the following properties for a preference % (with  and  denoting
the asymmetric and symmetric parts, respectively):
A0 - Choice Is Valuable: x  ? for all x 2 X .
A1 - Order: % is a weak order.
A2 - Continuity: For all g, g0, g00 2 ∆ (X [ X ) such that g00 % g % g0, there exists
α 2 [0, 1] such that αg00 + (1  α) g0  g.
A3 - Independence: For all g, g0, g00 2 ∆ (X [ X ) and α 2 [0, 1]: g % g0 , αg +
(1  α) g00 % αg0 + (1  α) g00.
A4 - Imperfect Attention: For all x 2 X and a 2 X: a % b for all b 2 x ) a  x.
A0 is just a definition of the range of choice situations we consider, namely ones in
which themenus are ‘opportunity sets’ in the sense that they contain alternatives better
than not choosing. A1-A3 are a version of the vNM axioms applied to the particular
domain of menus and alternatives. Finally, A4 states that being endowed with any a
is strictly preferable to choosing from a menu containing alternatives that are no better
than a (including a itself). As argued in the introduction, A4 is the essence of imperfect
attention.
Definition 1 An imperfect attention preference (i.a.p.) is a preference that satisfies A0-A4.
We shall establish a link between a i.a.p. and a numerical representation of menu
values suggesting the two-stage stochastic process of choice -first consider, then choose-
that we have discussed earlier.
A strict total order ˆ of X refines % if a  b ) aˆb. In the definition below recall
that we identify degenerate lotteries on an outcome with the outcome itself.
Definition 2 A vNM attention representation for % is a triple (ˆ, u, α), with ˆ a strict total
order of X that refines %, u : ∆ (X [ X ) ! R a vNM utility function representing %, and
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α : X [ X ! (0, 1), such that, for all x 2 X :4
u (x) = ∑
a2x
∏
b2x:bˆa
(1  α (b, x)) α (a, x) u (a) +∏
a2x
(1  α (a, x)) u (?) (1)
In this representation u is an evaluation function, with u (a) in particular being the
value for the agent of being endowed with a, not to be confused in the simplified no-
tation with u (fag) (the value of choosing from menu fag, equal to α (a, fag) u (a)).
The function α is an attention function that assigns a value to the attention received
by each alternative in each menu: the interpretation is that any alternative a has a
chance 1  α (a, x) of being missed by the agent in menu x. The strict ordering ˆ is
a tie-breaking device that resolves indifferences between the alternatives that are con-
sidered. Under these interpretations, the agent maximises u on the set of alternatives
that are both feasible and considered.
3 Analysis
We shall impose restrictions on the attention function. But evenwithout any restriction,
not all % have a vNM attention representation. It is instructive to go through a couple
of examples.
Suppose first that x = fa, bg and
x  a % b  ?
Then, if there were a vNM attention representation, we would have
u (x) = α (a, x) u (a) + (1  α (a, x)) α (b, x) u (b)
+ (1  α (a, x)) (1  α (b, x)) u (?) > u (a)  u (b) > u (?)
a contradiction.5 These preferences might result from attaching intrinsic value to the
act of choice: you might value having the choice between Pravda and Wall Street Jour-
nal more than being ‘endowed’ with Pravda, even if ultimately you would choose
4We use the convention that the product over the empty set is equal to one.
5Even if we weakened the previous relations to x % a % b  ?, insofar as these preferences deviate
from those in the main text, the agent would clearly have to have perfect attention at least for one
alternative, a case also excluded from the representation.
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Pravda anyway. A4, which aims to isolate the attention motive, directly rules out such
preferences.
A more subtle example of preference that cannot be captured by a vNM attention
representation is as follows. Let x = fa, bg and
a  b  fbg
a  x  fbg (2)
x  ka+ (1  k) b for some k 2 (0, 1)
The preference in the second line is not essential and serves only to simplify the proof
of the Observation below. The key preference is in the third line. The indifference
between a menu and a mixture of the (endowed) alternatives it contains could be nat-
urally explained by correlation in consideration. For example, suppose that when faced
with the menu x the agent considers only a with probability k and considers only b
with probability (1  k), leading to the indifference in 2. However, this consideration
pattern obviously cannot be generated independently by means of parameters α (a, x)
and α (b, x). Another explanation, that does not rely on correlation, is that with proba-
bility k the agent considers both a and b (then choosing a) and with probability (1  k)
he considers only b. This consideration pattern can be generated independently with
attention parameters α (a, x) = k and α (b, x) = 1, but this type of full attention for
an alternative is not admissible in our framework. We show that, short of assuming
correlation, full attention for b is implied by the above preferences, leading to a contra-
diction:
Observation: The preferences in (2) have no vNM attention representation.
Proof. Suppose that a vNM attention representation exists, and let u be such a repre-
sentation normalised by u (?) = 0. Then:
ku (a) + (1  k) u (b) = u (x) = α (a, x) u (a) + (1  α (a, x)) α (b, x) u (b)
implying α (b, x) = 1. Since a  x  fbg, we have u (a) > u (x) > u (fbg), so that
u (x) = k0u (a) +
 
1  k0

u (fbg)
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for some k0 2 (0, 1). Then, since u (fbg) = α (b, fbg) u (b) + 0 by the normalised repre-
sentation, we have
u (x) = α (a, x) u (a) + (1  α (a, x)) u (b) = k0u (a) +
 
1  k0

α (b, fbg) u (b)
implying α (b, fbg) = 1. It follows that u (fbg) = u (b), so that u cannot represent
b  fbg, a contradiction.
This example highlights what kind of pattern is excluded by the lack of correlation
that is implicit in a vNM representation. While no single axiom in a i.a.p. rules out the
above preference configuration directly, we shall see that the axioms as a whole do so.
Indeed, Theorem 1 below says that Choice Is Valuable and Imperfect Attention to-
gether with vNM rationality are equivalent to a vNM attention representation, with an
additional twist.
It turns out that i.a.p. also limits the way attention for an alternative may depend
on the menu. In principle, one may imagine that adding an alternative to a menu in-
creases the attention paid to an existing alternative. This could be the case, for example,
through a similarity effect, when the new alternative is similar to the existing one. Or,
a product offered by a multiproduct firm (e.g. a program of a media company) may
draw attention to other products offered by the same firm.6 But if preferences are i.a.p.
this effect can be excluded when the new alternative is better than the existing ones.
Preferences have a vNM attention representation if and only if they have a vNM at-
tention representation in which the addition of a new top alternative to a menu cannot
increase the attention received by any of the existing alternatives.
A vNM attention representation (ˆ, u, α) satisfies monotonicity in consideration if
bˆa for all a 2 x ) α (a, x)  α (a, x [ fbg) for all a 2 x.
Monotonicity in consideration (and much more) is implied for example when the
attention parameters have the Luce structure α (a, x) = λ(a)
∑b λ(b)
, where λ is a strictly
positive real valued function of the alternatives. Another situation where monotonic-
ity in consideration is a natural property is when the vNM attention representation
6As in Eliaz and Spiegler [12].
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is the reduced form of a search process. Suppose the agent searches randomly and
sets a reservation value, at which he stops searching. Then adding a top alternative a
should make it less likely that the other alternatives will be seen, since the agent will
stop whenever he finds a. On the other hand, monotonicity in consideration excludes
the effect studied in Payro and Ülkü [33], whereby the agent may consider inferior
alternatives just because they are similar to the top alternative in the menu.7
Theorem 1 The relation % is an imperfect attention preference if and only if it has a vNM
attention representation (ˆ, u, α) that satisfies monotonicity in consideration.
The proof of the theorem is not difficult but it is long and is thus relegated to an
appendix. The logic of the proof is that the axioms enable an iterated ‘peeling off’
procedure that makes any menu x indifferent to a lottery over two outcomes, one of
them being a sub-menu obtained by removing an alternative in x, as follows. Suppose
for simplicity that preferences are strict and number the alternatives in x from best to
worst as x = fa1, ...aKg. Suppose also that x  xn fa1g. Given that a1  x by A4, we
can construct (thanks to Continuity) a lottery αa1 + (1  α) xn fa1g for some unique
α 2 (0, 1) that is indifferent to x, so that by the vNM axioms this can be represented
as u (x) = αu (a1) + (1  α) u (xn fa1g) for some vNM utility u. Then we can iterate
the process applying the argument successively to xn fa1g, xn fa1, a2g,..., and show
that the resulting formula has the required properties. The procedure is markedly less
straightforward when xn fa1g % x, but it retains the same flavour.
Observe that a i.a.p. may be such that two menus x and y of the same cardinality
that contain indifferent alternatives (in the sense that there exists a bijection f from x to
ywith f (a)  a for all a 2 x) are not necessarily indifferent. For example, if a  b  c it
can be the case that fa, cg  fb, cg. In the interpretation we are giving preferences, this
is not a puzzling phenomenon: the discrepancy in the values of menus that contain
indifferent alternatives can be explained by the different levels of attention received
by the alternatives in the two menus - even if indifferent between a taxi and a bus,
you may fail to spot bus number 38 out of many buses outside a station, while any
7Payro and Ülkü do not explicitly mention consideration effects, but this is a possible interpretation
of their choice model.
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taxi would do. In the previous example, α (a, fa, cg) > α (b, fb, cg) and α (c, fa, cg) =
α (c, fb, cg) would rationalise the preference.
A second observation concerns the uniqueness of the representation. As is obvious,
the same attention parameters work with any positive affine transformation of u. In
general, however, while thanks to the vNM axioms the evaluation function u is cardi-
nally unique (given the preference), it may only be possible to restrict, but not to pin
down uniquely, the attention functions α that are compatible with a given preference.
Uniqueness is not guaranteed given the nonlinear way the attention parameters enter
the representation. However, the monotonicity condition in the representation helps to
put some bounds on the attention parameters. This point is illustrated in the following:
Example 1 Let X = fa, bg, suppose that preferences satisfy A0-A4 and are such that a 
b  fa, bg  fag  fbg, and suppose that u represents preferences with
X [ X a b fa, bg fag fbg ?
u () U pU qpU rU sU 0
where U > 0, p, q, r, s 2 (0, 1) and s < r < qp. It is easy to see (see Appendix A.2 for details)
that the representation of u (fag), u (fbg) and u (X), the restriction that α (b,X) 2 (0, 1)
and monotonicity in consideration imply that
α (a,X) 2

qp  s
1  s
, qp

Since qp >
qp s
1 s , qp < 1 the interval is non-degenerate.
There is of course a second source of non-uniqueness in the way that ˆ breaks in-
differences in%, but this is less important since the evaluation of amenu is not impacted
by the exact choice of ˆ, the overall attention enjoyed by alternatives in a menu that
belong to the same indifference class being independent of the choice of ˆ. For menu
evaluation purposes, regardless of how the alternatives within the same indifference
class are ranked by ˆ what matters is the probability that some alternative in a’s indif-
ference class is noted by the decision maker. There is no bonus for noticing more than
one alternative in any indifference class, given that only the single alternative that is
ultimately chosen determines value. So at least in this respect the lack of a complete
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identification of the attention parameters does not matter. Note however that together
with Monotonicity in consideration the exact specification of ˆmay change the admis-
sible range of the attention parameters α (a, x) (this is illustrated in Appendix A.3).
Full identifiability of the attention parameters is achieved when the model is spe-
cialised, as shown next.
4 Menu independence and preference for flexibility
In this section we study the important special case in which the attention for an al-
ternative a is independent of the menu in which a appears. In the case of brands,
for example, there is some evidence that the salience of each brand is independent of
which other brands are available (van Nierop et al. [31]).
The ‘choice from menu’ properties of the case with menu independent attention
have already been explored in Manzini and Mariotti [26]. Here we are interested in
the menu preference counterpart of this feature: what are the additional properties of
preferences over menus/alternatives, beside vNM rationality and Imperfect Attention,
that permit to assumemenu independent attention? The answer to this questions turns
out to be both simple and intriguing, and it hinges on how preferences behave with
respect to expansions of menus.
We have seen that the addition of top alternatives is (weakly) detrimental for the
chance of the existing alternatives to be considered. This fact points to a key feature
of the representation in theorem 1. Suppose that a % b. This preference is compatible
with:
α (b, fa, bg) < α (b, fbg)
1
(1  α (a, fa, bg))
 
α (a, fa, bg)
(1  α (a, fa, bg))
u (a)
u (b)
, α (b, fbg) u (b) > α (a, fa, bg) u (a) + (1  α (a, fa, bg)) α (b, fa, bg) u (b)
, fbg  fa, bg
In words, in a i.a.p. adding a new top alternative to a menu may decrease the value of
that menu. This can happen when adding the new alternative reduces by a sufficient
amount the attention paid to the best existing alternatives, provided that the atten-
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tion paid to the new top alternative isn’t too large. The following axiom excludes this
situation:
A5 - Top expansion: For all x 2 X and a 2 X: a /2 x and a % b for all b 2 x )
fag [ x  x.
A5 can be seen in part as a standard rationality requirement. There is however a
residual component of imperfect attention in this axiom, in that it allows the possibility
that a is indifferent to an existing best alternative while at the same time fag [ x 
x. On the contrary, a perfectly attentive and rational agent should regard the menus
fag [ x and x as indifferent. Yet a rational but imperfectly attentive agent might miss
a top alternative with higher probability when there are fewer of them.
In a vNM attention representation (ˆ, u, α), α is menu independent if, for all x, y 2 X
and for all a 2 x \ y, α (a, x) = α (a, y). In this case we write for simplicity α (a) instead
of α (a, x).
Theorem 2 An imperfect attention preference % satisfies A5 if and only if it has a vNM at-
tention representation (ˆ, u, α) in which α is menu independent.
Proof. Necessity. Suppose the representation holds with α menu independent. Let
a /2 x and a % b for all b 2 x. Then observing that x [ fag = fb 2 x : bˆag [ fag [
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fb 2 x : aˆbg, we have
u (x [ fag)  u (x) =
= ∑
b2x:bˆa
∏
c2x:cˆb
(1  α (c)) α (b) u (b)
+α (a) u (a) ∏
b2x:bˆa
(1  α (b))
+ (1  α (a)) ∑
b2x:aˆb
∏
c2x:cˆb
(1  α (c)) α (b) u (b) 
+ (1  α (a))∏
b2x
(1  α (b)) u (?)
  ∑
b2x
∏
c2x:cˆb
(1  α (c)) α (b) u (b) ∏
b2x
(1  α (b)) u (?)
= α (a) ∏
b2x:bˆa
(1  α (b))
 
u (a)  ∑
b2x:aˆb
∏
c2x:cˆb
(1  α (c)) α (b) u (b) +
  ∏
b2x:aˆb
(1  α (b)) u (?)
!
> 0
where the last inequality follows from the fact that u (a)  u (b) for all b 2 x such
that aˆb and that the sum of the coefficients on the last two terms add up to less than
unity.8
For sufficiency, theorem 1 ensures that % has a vNM attention representation. To
prove that α is menu independent in the representation of the theorem we begin by
proving two claims.
Claim 1: For all x 2 X : a /2 x and a % b for all b 2 x ) α (b, x) = α (b, x [ fag) for all
b 2 x.
Proof. If A5 holds, the second and third case we have examined in the proof of theo-
rem 1 (i.e. xn fag % x) are excluded. So the first case x  xn fag applies and yields
α (b, x) = α (b, x [ fag) for all b 2 x. 2
Claim 2: For all x, y 2 X : a /2 x [ y and a % b for all b 2 x [ y) α (a, x) = α (a, y).
8This holds since
∑
b2x:aˆb
∏
c2x:cˆb
(1  α (c)) α (b) u (b) + ∏
b2x:aˆb
(1  α (b)) <
∑
b2x
∏
c2x:cˆb
(1  α (c)) α (b) u (b) +∏
b2x
(1  α (b)) = 1
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Proof. Since by A0 and A4 a  fag  ?, by the vNM axioms there exists a unique
αa,fag 2 (0, 1) such that
fag  αa,faga+

1  αa,fag

?
Similarly, considering any x 2 X such that a /2 x and a % b for all b 2 x, it follows by
A4 and A5 that a  fag [ x  x. By A2 then there exist a unique αa,x 2 (0, 1) such that
fag [ x  αa,xa+

1  αa,fag

x
By A3 it must be
k fag+ (1  k) [fag [ x]
 k
h
αa,faga+

1  αa,fag

?
i
+ (1  k)
h
αa,xa+

1  αa,fag

x
i
=

kαa,fag + (1  k) αa,x

a+ k

1  αa,fag

?+ (1  k)

1  αa,fag

x (3)
for any k 2 (0, 1). Fix one such k. Since it is also the case (by A4) that a  fag and
a  fag [ x, then a  ka + (1  k) a  k fag + (1  k) (fag [ x) by A3. In addition,
also by A3, k fag+ (1  k) (fag [ x)  k?+ (1  k) x. Therefore
a  k fag+ (1  k) (fag [ x)  k?+ (1  k) x
and, by A2 there exists a unique γ 2 (0, 1) such that
k fag+ (1  k) (fag [ x)  γa+ (1  γ) [k?+ (1  k) x]
But this is simply expression (3), so that it must be
kαa,fag + (1  k) αa,x

= γ
k

1  αa,fag

= k (1  γ)
(1  k)

1  αa,fag

= (1  γ) (1  k)
9>>>=
>>>;, αa,fag = αa,x
Applying the same argument to a y 2 X such that a /2 y and a % b for all b 2 y yields
αa,y = αa,fag = αa,x, proving the claim. 2
To prove sufficiency, take x, y 2 X and a 2 x \ y (if a /2 x \ y for all a then there
is nothing to prove). Let xL = fb 2 x : a  bg, enumerate arbitrarily the elements
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other than a in xnxL, that is let xnxL = fa, b1, ...bng, and let xi = xL [ fb1, ...big for all
i = 1, ...n where n = jxnxLj   1. Similarly, let yL = fc 2 y : a  cg, ynyL = fa, c1, ...cmg
and let yi = yL [

c1, ...cj
	
for all j = 1, ...m where m = jynyLj   1. Claim 2 im-
plies that α (a, fag [ xL) = α (a, fag [ yL). By Claim 1 we have that α (a, fag [ xL) =
α (a, fag [ x1), and by induction α (a, fag [ xi) = α (a, fag [ xi+1) for all i  n   1,
where of course x = fag [ xn, so that
α (a, x) = α (a, fag [ xL) = α (a, fag [ yL) (4)
A similar reasoning applied to α (a, fag [ yL) yields
α (a, y) = α (a, fag [ yL) = α (a, fag [ xL) (5)
and then by (4) and (5) we conclude α (a, x) = α (a, y).
Preference for flexibility. We can also relate the menu independence of the attention
parameters to a version of a classical axiom of the menu choice literature, ‘preference
for flexibility’, which states that the agent is better off when the menu expands (ir-
respective of whether the expansion is by means of top alternatives or not). When
the attention parameters are menu independent, it is easily verified (by a calculation
analogous to the proof of necessity in theorem 2) that for any x and a /2 x, we have
u (x [ fag) > u (x). Therefore the following axiom is necessary in the vNM attention
representation with menu independent attention parameters:
A6 (Strict preference for flexibility): y  x ) x  y.
Since it is also true that A6 directly implies A5 as a special case, we conclude that
it can replace it in the characterisation of theorem 2.9 Strict preference for flexibility is,
for a vNM rational but inattentive agent, the preference counterpart of menu indepen-
dence in attention:
9Necessity of A6 is straightforward. Rather than providing a full proof, we show the argument with
an example. Consider sets y = fag and x = fa, bg so that u (y) = α (a) u (a) + (1  α (a)) u (?). Then
either u (x) = α (a) u (a) + (1  α (a)) α (b) u (b) + (1  α (a)) (1  α (b)) u (?) (if aˆb, so that u (a) 
u (b)), or u (x) = α (b) u (b) + (1  α (b)) α (a) u (a) + (1  α (a)) (1  α (b)) u (?) (if bˆa and u (b) 
u (a)). Either way, u (x) > u (y) so that x  y.
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Corollary 1 An imperfect attention preference satisfies A6 if and only if it has a vNM atten-
tion representation (ˆ, u, α) in which α is menu independent.
On the one hand, this result highlights the distinction from other models. For ex-
ample, if the agent were thought averse in the sense of Ortoleva [32], he would never
strictly prefer larger menus. On the other hand, Corollary 1 also highlights how the
same menu preference may have different interpretations according to the context.
While the classical interpretation of preference for flexibility is in terms of uncertainty
about future tastes, it now turns out to be also indicative of a specially disciplined form
of inattention. This is an instance of how it is impossible to get to the ‘right’ represen-
tation - that is, to the true model of the cognitive process underlying choice - only on
the basis of preferences: extraneous information of some kind is necessary.
A formula for the attention parameters. Withmenu independent attention for all x 2 X
and with aˆb for all b 2 xn fag:
u (x) = ∑
b2x
∏
c2x:cˆb
(1  α (c)) α (b) u (b) +∏
b2x
(1  α (b)) u (?)
= α (a) u (a) +
+ (1  α (a))
0
@ ∑
b2xnfag
∏
c2xnfag:cˆb
(1  α (c)) α (b) u (b) + ∏
b2xnfag
(1  α (b)) u (?)
1
A
= α (a) u (a) + (1  α (a)) u (xn fag)
and therefore
α (a) =
u (x)  u (xn fag)
u (a)  u (xn fag)
.
This formula is interesting in two respects. First, it shows that in this case the α (a)
are uniquely defined, since they are invariant to any positive affine transformation of u,
and u (as a vNM utility) is unique precisely up to such transformations:. Observe that
for any a 2 x there exists an x with a 2 x and aˆb for all b 2 xn fag, for example
x = fag.
Secondly, the formula provides an interpretation of the attention parameters in
terms of utility. The attention paid to a measures the ratio between the incremental
utility of offering the agent the opportunity of choosing a (from a menu in which a is best),
and the incremental utility of endowing the agent with a instead.
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5 A discussion on interpretation and related literature
5.1 Interpretation of %
We return to the interpretation of the menu/alternatives ranking in our model. As
we mentioned in the introduction, the interpretation of this ranking as held by the
same agent who is supposed to make choices from menus is not straightforward. If
the agent may neglect some alternatives in the menu, his ranking of menus will not
express his genuine preference over them, but rather a preference that is biased by his
incomplete powers of attention. On the other hand, if we assumed that somehow the
agent perceives all alternatives at the stage of evaluating menus, it is not clear why the
later stage of a choice from menu may be vitiated by the lack of consideration of some
alternatives. For these reasons, we have assumed so far that % expresses either an
objective normative ranking or the ranking of a second decision maker who, while not
making choices from menus, is in a ‘paternalistic’ relation with the agent in the sense
that he (1) is responsible for selecting a menu from which the agent would choose, and
could force the agent to consume certain alternatives; (2) knows both the preferences
and the cognitive abilities of the agent; and (3) internalises the agent’s preferences over
alternatives. Such a decision maker could be a policy maker, a doctor, or a guardian
setting constraints on the agent’s behaviour. For example, a regulator might regulate
more or less stringently the markets for financial products, houses, health and so on.
The agent might be forced to subscribe to a given pension or health plan, or be offered
the opportunity to pick from plans available in the market.
It is, however, also possible to interpret % as being held by the same agent who
chooses from menus. A first interpretation is that the inattentive agent looks at past
choices from menus and evaluates their results. At some point after having made
choices from menus, he becomes aware of the exact composition of the menus. He can
thus make ‘hindsight’ statements of the type ‘I’ve been better off choosing from menu
x rather than from menu y’, ‘I ended up better off when having a than when I faced a
choice from x’, and so on.
A second possibility, this time ex-ante, that suggests itself is imperfect memory.
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Some alternatives may escape the agent’s grasp after he has contemplated the menu
and before the moment of choice. In this interpretation, when evaluating menus he is
aware of his memory imperfection. Endowed a means immediate choice and a 2 x
means that a will be available for choice later on provided it hasn’t escaped attention.
This interpretation is analogous to the random availability assumption in Barberá and
Grodal [2]. These authors study decision makers who rank menus, have von Neuman-
Morgenstern utility functions over alternatives, and attach subjective probabilities to
each subset of alternatives surviving to the stage when the choice from the menu has
to be made. For instance, it may be that at the time when the choice from a menu x is
implemented the stocks of the preferred alternatives have run out. Thus the problem
facing the agent is that of ranking menus ex ante (so that the choice from the menu is
actually not carried out) based on the expected utility calculated taking into account
the survival probabilities. In our context, availability can be interpreted psychologi-
cally: it expresses the ability of the agent to hold in mind the necessary information
about the content of the menu. In this interpretation, too, the distinction between a
and fag arises quite naturally, as a must, unlike fag, be available later, as the agent
has been endowed with it (Barberá and Grodal [2] do not make such a distinction, and
their framework is in the vein of Kreps [22])
A third interpretation, also ex-ante, is in terms of absent-mindedness or ‘imple-
mentation errors’ (with self-awareness). In choosing exits from motorways, you know
that it is better to take a given exit, but you are aware that you may end up missing
it and being forced to take an inferior second exit. In this case you might for instance
have to compare situations such as ‘driving and having to choose from {first motor-
way exit, second motorway exit}’ (with the risk of choosing suboptimally) and ‘getting
someone to drive you to destination’ (the endowed alternative). Absent-mindedness
as a behavioral phenomenon has been examined by Piccione and Rubinstein [34] (in a
game theoretic context) and the subsequent literature. Implementation errors in choice
are studied by Mattson and Weibull [28] as a foundation for the logit model. Finally,
the possibility of making choices over menus while contemplating the possibility of
making mistakes at the time of choice from the menu is a possible interpretation of
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frameworks such as Ahn and Sarver [1] and Koida [20].10 While in that literature the
reaction to such mistakes is modeled as a preference for commitment in the sense of
preference for a singleton menu, we admit the possibility of missing an alternative
even in a singleton menu.
5.2 Related literature
Two papers consider menu-dependence in attention in a different way from the one
modeled here: Echenique, Saito and Tserenjigmid [11]’s (EST) and Brady and Rehbeck
[5] (BR).
EST’s ‘Perception Adjusted Luce Model’ (PALM) shares with ours some of the for-
malism of the choice from menu stage, though with a very different interpretation. A
PALM has two primitives, a utility function u : X [ X ! R and a weak order %p (the
perception order) encapsulating the order with which alternatives are perceived. a p b
signifies that a is perceived sooner than b. For any x 2 X , u (x) denotes the probability
of not choosing any alternative from x. It is similar to u (?) in a vNM attention repre-
sentation, with the important difference that in a PALM the utility of not choosing can
vary across choice sets. Letting xn %p denote the indifference classes induced by %p
on x, in a PALM the probability p%p (a, x) that alternative a is chosen from x is
p%p (a, x) = λ (a, x)
0
@ ∏
τ2xn%p :τpa
 
1  ∑
b2x:b2τ
λ (b, x)
!1A
where, for all a 2 x:
λ (a, x) =
u (a)
∑a02x u (a
0) + u (x)
That is, λ (a, x) is the standard Luce choice probability adjusted for a menu dependent
outside option (as captured by u (x)). The structure of a PALM and of our representa-
tion
piap (a, x) = α (a, x) ∏
b2x:bˆa
(1  α (b, x))
10E.g. in Koida: "Namely, she prefers the restaurant that serves only chicken to the one that serves
both chicken and fish, to avoid “mistakenly” choosing suboptimal alternatives ex post."
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are formally similar, since when the perception ordering p in a PALM is strict we
have
pp (a, x) = λ (a, x)
0
@ ∏
b2x:bpa
(1  λ (b, x))
1
A
A PALM thus offers an alternative way of interpreting our own implied process of
choice from menus. Our attention function is replaced by a specific functional form
(Luce probabilities) that, depending on the values u takes on menus, can satisfy the
Monotonicity in consideration condition: if b p a for all a 2 x, then λ (a, x) 
λ (a, x [ fbg) as long as u (b) + u (x [ fbg)  u (x), which is compatible with a variety
of u functions. Monotonicity in consideration generalises for example the condition of
regularity that EST use in the characterisation,11 and for menus of two alternatives it
is implied by regularity. However a vNM attention representation does not generalise
a PALM, as there are admissible u functions that would imply a contradiction of the
monotonicity condition in theorem 1.
BR strictly generalise Manzini and Mariotti [26] in a different way (and with a dif-
ferent methodology) from ours. In their model, the probability P (C, A) of a consider-
ation set C obtaining when the agent faces menu A is generated by a fixed probability
distribution pi over 2X, by
P (C, A) =
pi (C)
∑
BA
pi (B)
The fact that pi is fixed (menu-independent) disciplines the consideration probabilities
in a way that is not required in a vNM attention representation. On the other hand,
in this way BR capture both menu-dependence and correlation in the formation of the
consideration set, while a vNM attention representation implies stochastic indepen-
dence.
In these two papers as well as in ours the interpretation of the concept of inatten-
tion is in line with those of Caplin and Dean [6] (CD); Caplin, Dean and Martin [7]
(CDM); Eliaz and Spiegler ([12], [13]) (ES); Manzini and Mariotti [26] (MM); Masatli-
oglu, Nakajma and Ozbay [27] (MNO); and Sovinsky Goeree [39] (SG). In all these
papers inattention means failing to consider alternatives in a menu. While ES explore
11See EST for details.
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in detail the consequences of imperfect attention in a strategic setting, MNO and MM
give an abstract characterisation of consideration sets models based on a standard re-
vealed preference method. They consider the agent’s choices from a set of menus and
state conditions under which the agent’s choices could be interpreted as deriving from
a certain type of imperfect attention (the same applies to EST and BR discussed above).
MNO focus on deterministic choices and look at a special restriction of the dependence
of attention on the menu. MM study stochastic choices and characterise the menu in-
dependent version of the choice procedure implied by theorem 1. CD instead innovate
the revealed preference method by using an enriched set of non-standard data, and
assuming that the analyst can observe provisional choices and contemplation times.
CDM put in practice this methodology in an experimental setting, validating the CD
search-satisficing model of choice. While the innovative techniques used by CD and
CDM allow in a sense the consideration to be observed directly by the analyst, SG
uses careful econometric techniques of a more standard kind to infer the existence of
non-trivial consideration sets in the purchase of personal computers.
The ‘rational inattention’ literature started by Sims [38] takes a different view of
inattention: the agent faces uncertainty about the true state of the world and must se-
lect, at a cost, an optimal signalling structure (a joint distribution on signals and states),
on the basis of which ex-post choices from menus are made. The work by de Oliveira,
Denti, Mihm and Ozbek [10], however, is in a broadly similar vein to ours, in that it re-
lates inattention to preferences over menus. By developing the menu choice approach
(see also Ergin and Sarver [14], who laid out a related formalism to axiomatise contem-
plation costs), this is the first work to provide a such a type of foundation for rational
inattention. Like that of Ergin and Sarver [14], it exploits much subtler nuances of
preferences over lotteries than we do in this paper.
Finally we should mention Machina [25], perhaps the first to argue for an explana-
tion of stochastic behaviour bymeans of a deterministic preference over lotteries rather
than a stochastic preference as in RUM. We note that this distinction may sometimes
be a matter of appearance: the vNM attention model with menu-independent parame-
ters illustrates this by using a deterministic preference while being formally part of the
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RUM family (as shown in MM). Even our general model, while not a RUM, admits a
preference based interpretation: α (a, x) is the probability of being ‘in the mood’ for a
when the menu is x. Nevertheless, Machina’s remains an important intuition.12
6 Failures of Regularity and the Attraction Effect
Manymodels of stochastic choice satisfy the property of Regularity, according to which
the probability of choosing an alternative does not increase as the menu gets larger.
Regularity is satisfied by the very general Random Utility Model (RUM)13, and con-
sequently by the version of our model with menu independent attention parameters
(which, as shown in Manzini and Mariotti [26], is a particular case of RUM), as well as
by Luce’s [23] classical model, its Gumbel error and multinomial logit versions popu-
lar in econometrics,14 and also by its recent generalisation by Gul, Natenzon and Pe-
sendorfer [17].15 However, some prominent anomalies contradict Regularity, in partic-
ular the attraction effect and the compromise effect. These anomalies are both reasonably
well documented in experimental findings and introspectively plausible. We consider
it as an important feature of a stochastic theory of choice that it offers a pathway to
representing such anomalies.
Marketers use a number of strategies to manipulate the attractiveness or otherwise
of alternatives. The attraction effect (also known as the ‘asymmetric dominance’ effect,
see Huber and Puto [18], [19]) refers to the fact that the choice frequency of a target
alternative t increases when a newdecoy alternative d is introduced in amenu, with the
property that the d is markedly worse than the target t, while incomparable to a third
(‘other’) alternative, o. This ranking is generally induced by presenting alternatives
12See Fudenberg, Iijima and Strzalecki [15] for a recent and very general development of Machina’s
approach.
13In a RUM model (Block and Marschack [4]) the agent picks the top element of a ranking extracted
at random according to a known probability distribution.
14See Holman and Marley (as attributed in [24]), Mc Fadden [29] and Yellot [40] for the Gumbel error
interpretation of the Luce/Logit model.
15EST and BR discussed in the previous section are notable instances of models that can explain vio-
lations of Regularity.
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as described in two desirable attributes/dimensions: while the ranking between t and
o in one dimension is reversed in the other, d is Pareto dominated by t but Pareto
incomparable to o. The compromise effect instead refers to the introduction of a different
type of decoy, which has the highest degree of one attribute and the lowest of another
in such a way that t is now ‘middle ranking’.
However, subsequent research has identified various other strategies to increase t’s
choice probability: the decoy may be Pareto dominated by both t and o, or may Pareto
dominate the target but be unavailable for choice (i.e. ‘phantom’ decoy), and so on.
The compromise and attraction effects are just components of a family.
All these effects are easy to accommodate in our setup. From the formula p (a, A) =
α (a, A) ∏
b2A:bˆa
(1  α (b, A)) it follows immediately that p (a, A) increases with α (a, A)
and decreases with α (b, A) for any b 2 A such that bˆa. Now consider adding a decoy
d to a menu. Then, as long as aˆd, we have
p (a, A [ fdg) = α (a, A [ fdg) ∏
b2A[fdg:bˆa
(1  α (b, A [ fdg))
= α (a, A [ fdg) ∏
b2A:bˆa
(1  α (b, A [ fdg))
As long as the introduction of d increases the attention parameter of alternative awith-
out affecting the attention parameters of the other alternatives (or at least without in-
creasing them too much), we have p (a, A [ fdg) > p (a, A), while p (b, A [ fdg) <
p (b, A) for all b such that aˆb. Even if bˆa we can still have a decrease in the prob-
ability that b is chosen after the introduction of the decoy alternative, provided that
the attention paid to it is decreased by this event. Indeed, adding a dominated alter-
native imposes in our model no constraints on the attention parameters of the existing
alternatives. The advantage of this way of modelling the phenomenon is that the pre-
vious reasoning holds regardless of the type of decoy that is introduced, whether it
is a phantom alternative, or one that induces compromise, or a symmetrically domi-
nated alternative, and so on. What conforms to the intentions of the manipulator and
accords with the structure of our model is that the target alternative is made more ap-
pealing not by improvements to it, but simply by framing - what we call ‘attention’ is
whatever it is that the manipulator/marketer strives to influence. For example, in the
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compromise effect it is hard to tell whether what is behaviourally a compromise-seeking
attitude really reflects a compromise seeking psychology. Indeed, Mochon and Freder-
ick [30] find experimentally that an order effect could be a more plausible explanation
for the ‘compromise effect’: the alternative presented as second seems more salient in
the choice between three items, regardless of its attributes. We would go even further
and regard ‘attention’ as a catch-all concept that gathers the factors, psychological or of
other nature, that affect choice through consideration and separately from preferences.
7 Concluding remarks
The most appealing aspect of the methodology of this paper is that it yields a specific
representation of imperfect attention using only a very broad, and we hope uncontro-
versial, definition of the welfare consequences of imperfect attention (our axiom A4),
without committing to any particular assumption on what causes it. Thus, our implied
choice model can be seen as a ‘reduced form’ of several more detailed stories that may
lie behind the agent’s failure to consider all alternatives. These stories may range from
search theories to models of brand loyalty. In addition to cognitive reasons, there may
also be ethical or ideological reasons why some available options are deliberately not
considered.
Because we have assumed vNM rationality, one can see our representation as cap-
turing deviations from rational behaviour that can be imputed exclusively to imperfect
attention and not to other cognitive imperfections. For example, since we have shown
that vNM rationality implies a lack of correlation in consideration, we can interpret
any evidence of correlated consideration as a separate departure from full rationality,
distinct form imperfect attention per se.16
It remains to be explored whether our approach may prove useful, as we hope,
to model aspects of bounded rationality different from imperfect attention. A hint of
a possible development in this direction is as follows. Each alternative may present
itself in two or more ‘modes’. So the full description of an alternative a is (a,m), spec-
16See Brady and Rehbeck [5] for intuitively plausible examples of correlations in consideration.
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ifying that a comes in mode m.17 In this paper m 2 fe, e¯g, where e =‘endowed’ and
e¯ =‘not endowed’. Specific restrictions on preferences over such enriched alternatives
and menus of them may capture different interpretations and psychological attitudes.
Examples of what a mode might indicate are: the procedure with which a is made
available; whether the acts of choice and of consumption of a are simultaneous or not;
whether a is the status quo; whether a is a social norm; whether a is chosen privately
or in front of an audience.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of theorem 1
Necessity. Suppose % on ∆ (X [ X ) has a vNM attention representation (ˆ, u, α) in
which α satisfies the monotonicity condition. We show that it satisfies A0-A4. Since
α (a, x) 2 (0, 1) for all x 2 X and a 2 x, it follows
u (x) = ∑
a2x
∏
b2x:bˆa
(1  α (b, x)) α (a, x) u (a) +∏
a2x
(1  α (a, x)) u (?) > u (?)
so that A0 holds. The necessity of A1-A3 is standard and thus omitted. Finally, let
a % b for all b 2 x. Then
u (x) = ∑
c2x
∏
c2x:cˆb
(1  α (c, x)) α (b, x) u (b) < u (a)
since the left hand side is a convex combination of values which do not exceed u (a)
and the sum of the weights on maxb2x u (b)  u (a) is strictly less than unity (given
that ∏
c2x
(1  α (c, x)), the weight on u (?), is strictly positive), so that A4 holds.
For sufficiency, let 0 be an arbitrary linear order of X and define ˆ lexicographi-
cally as follows: aˆb iff a  b or a  b and a 0 b. Denote menus by numbering the al-
ternatives in them according to ˆ, as x = fa1, ..., aKgwith aiˆai+1 for all i = 1, ...,K  1.
We will show that for all x 2 X there exist numbers α (a1, x) , ..., α (aK, x) 2 (0, 1) such
that
x  α (a1, x) a1 + (1  α (a1, x)) α (a2, x) a2 + ...+
K 1
∏
i=1
(1  α (ai, x)) α (aK, x) aK
+
K
∏
i=1
(1  α (ai, x))? (6)
Then by the vNM theorem and A1-A3 there exists a vNM utility u on ∆ (X [ X ) rep-
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resenting % such that
u (x) = u
 
α1 (a1, x) a1 + ...+
K 1
∏
i=1
(1  α (ai, x)) α (aK, x) aK +
K
∏
i=1
(1  α (ai, x))?
!
=
K
∑
i=1
i 1
∏
j=1
 
1  α
 
aj, x

α (ai, x) u (ai) +
K
∏
i=1
(1  α (ai, x)) u (?)
(we use the convention that
n
∏
i=m
f (i) = 1 and
n
∑
i=m
f (i) = 0 for all functions f : N !
(0, 1) whenever m > n).
If x consists of only one element, then by A0 and A4 a1  fa1g  ?. By the vNM
axioms and textbook arguments,
fa1g  α (a1, fa1g) a1 + (1  α (a1, fa1g))?
for some unique α (a1, fa1g) 2 (0, 1) and so the result holds. Suppose then that x
consists of two or more elements. There are three cases to consider. In all cases we
argue by induction on the cardinality of the menu, supposing that the assertion is true
for all menus with fewer than K elements and letting x = fa1, ..., aKg (where recall that
aiˆai+1 for all i = 1, ...,K  1).
Case 1: x  xn fa1g. Then a1  x  xn fa1g by A4, and by the vNM axioms there
exists a unique α (a1, x) 2 (0, 1) such that
x  α (a1, x) a1 + (1  α (a1, x)) xn fa1g .
By the inductive hypothesis, there exist α (a2, xn fa1g) , ..., α (aK, xn fa1g) 2 (0, 1) such
that
xn fa1g  α (a2, xn fa1g) a2 + ...+
K 1
∏
i=2
(1  α (ai, xn fa1g)) α (aK, xn fa1g) aK
+
K
∏
i=2
(1  α (ai, xn fa1g))?
and so by Independence the desired conclusion follows by setting α (ai, x) = α (ai, xn fa1g)
for all i = 2, ...,K. Note that in this case monotonicity in consideration is satisfied with
equality.
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Case 2: xn fa1g  x. Together with A0 this implies xn fa1g  x  ?, and by the vNM
axioms there exists a unique β 2 (0, 1) with
x  βxn fa1g+ (1  β)?. (7)
Moreover by A4 a1  xn fa1g  x, so that there exists a unique α 2 (0, 1) such that
xn fa1g  αa1 + (1  α) x.
Having defined α and β in this way, we claim that equation (6) (with the stated prop-
erties on the coefficients) holds by setting the coefficients recursively as follows:
α (a1, x) = αβ
(8)
α (ak, x) = γα (ak, xn fa1g) with
γ =
(1  α) β2
k 1
∏
i=2
(1  α (ai, xn fa1g))
1  αβ  (1  α) β2
 
k 1
∑
i=2
α (ai, xn fa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
 
1  α
 
aj, xn fa1g
!
for all k = 2, ...K.
Step 1: the α (ak, x) defined in equation (8) satisfy expression (6). By Independence
applied to formula (7), given the definition of α, it must be:
x  βαa1 + β (1  α) x+ (1  β)?. (9)
In turn, using the expression for x from condition (7) and Independence in expres-
sion (9) we have:
x  αβa1 + (1  α) β
2xn fa1g+ (1  β) (1+ β (1  α))?
so that by the inductive hypothesis and Independence:
x  αβa1 + (1  α) β
2
 
α (a2, xn fa1g) a2 + ...+
K 1
∏
i=2
(1  α (ai, xn fa1g)) α (aK, xn fa1g) aK
!
+ (1  β) (1+ β (1  α))?+ (1  α) β2
K
∏
i=2
(1  α (ai, xn fa1g))? (10)
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Using (8) for any k  2, we have
1  α (ak, x) = 1 
(1 α)β2
k 1
∏
i=2
(1 α(ai,xnfa1g))
1 αβ (1 α)β2
 
k 1
∑
i=2
α(ai,xnfa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
(1 α(aj,xnfa1g))
!α (ak, xn fa1g) =
=
1 αβ (1 α)β2
 
k 1
∑
i=2
α(ai,xnfa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
(1 α(aj,xnfa1g))
!
 (1 α)β2

k 1
∏
i=2
(1 α(ai,xnfa1g))

α(ak,xnfa1g)
1 αβ (1 α)β2
 
k 1
∑
i=2
α(ai,xnfa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
(1 α(aj,xnfa1g))
! =
=
1 αβ (1 α)β2
 
k 1
∑
i=2
α(ai,xnfa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
(1 α(aj,xnfa1g))+α(ak,xnfa1g)
k 1
∏
i=2
(1 α(ai,xnfa1g))
!
1 αβ (1 α)β2
 
k 1
∑
i=2
α(ai,xnfa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
(1 α(aj,xnfa1g))
! =
=
1 αβ (1 α)β2
k
∑
i=2
α(ai,xnfa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
(1 α(aj,xnfa1g))
1 αβ (1 α)β2
 
k 1
∑
i=2
α(ai,xnfa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
(1 α(aj,xnfa1g))
!
so that the numerator of 1   α (ak, x) is equal to the denominators of 1   α (ak+1, x)
and α (ak+1, x). Consequently, the product α (ak, x)
k 1
∏
i=1
(1  α (ai, x)) is a telescoping
product, yielding
α (ak, x)
k 1
∏
i=1
(1  α (ai, x)) = (1  α) β
2
k 1
∏
i=2
(1  α (ai, xn fa1g))
which is precisely the coefficient of ak in the lottery on the right hand side of (10).
Note (see Step 3 below) that in this case monotonicity in consideration is satisfied with
inequality.
Step 2: α (ak, x) > 0 for all k = 2, ...K. It is obvious that α (a1, x) > 0 given the
admissible values of α and β. For k = 2, ...K, note that the numerator is positive, and
that (given the admissible values of α and β) we have 0 < (1  α) β2 < (1  αβ). So
the denominator is positive given that
k 1
∑
i=2
α (ai, xn fa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
 
1  α
 
aj, xn fa1g

< 1
To prove this last inequality, observe that (keeping an eye on the summation and prod-
34
uct indexes):
k 1
∑
i=2
α (ai, xn fa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
 
1  α
 
aj, xn fa1g

< 1
, α (a2, xn fa1g) +
k 1
∑
i=3
α (ai, xn fa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
 
1  α
 
aj, xn fa1g

< 1
,
k 1
∑
i=3
α (ai, xn fa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
 
1  α
 
aj, xn fa1g

< 1  α (a2, xn fa1g)
,
k 1
∑
i=3
α (ai, xn fa1g)
i 1
∏
j=3
 
1  α
 
aj, xn fa1g

< 1
, α (a3, xn fa1g) +
k 1
∑
i=4
α (ai, xn fa1g)
i 1
∏
j=3
 
1  α
 
aj, xn fa1g

< 1
,
k 1
∑
i=4
α (ai, xn fa1g)
i 1
∏
j=3
 
1  α
 
aj, xn fa1g

< 1  α (a3, xn fa1g)
,
k 1
∑
i=4
α (ai, xn fa1g)
i 1
∏
j=4
 
1  α
 
aj, xn fa1g

< 1
, ...
, α (ak 1, xn fa1g) (1  α (ak 1, xn fa1g)) < 1
where the last inequality holds true by the inductive hypothesis, since jxn fa1gj =
K  1).
Step 3: α (ak, x) < 1. It is obvious that α (a1, x) < 1 given the admissible values of α
and β. For the other coefficients we show that
α (ak, x)
α (ak, xn fa1g)
< 1 for all k  K, (11)
which implies the result (since α (ak, xn fa1g) < 1 by the inductive hypothesis on the
cardinality of x). We proceed by induction on k (given K). If k = 2, then from the
second line in (8) we have
α (a2, x)
α (a2, xn fa1g)
=
(1  α) β2
1  αβ
< 1.
Now suppose that α(ak,x)
α(ak,xnfa1g)
< 1 for all k for which 2  k  k0   1 < K, and consider
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k = k0. Then
α(ak0 ,x)
α(ak0 ,xnfa1g)
=
(1 α)β2
k0 1
∏
i=2
(1 α(ai,xnfa1g))
1 αβ (1 α)β2
 
k0 1
∑
i=2
α(ai,xnfa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
(1 α(aj,xnfa1g))
! < 1
, (1  α) β2
k0 1
∏
i=2
(1  α (ai, xn fa1g))
< 1  αβ  (1  α) β2
 
k0 1
∑
i=2
α (ai, xn fa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
 
1  α
 
aj, xn fa1g
!
, (1  α) β2 (1  α (ak0 1, xn fa1g))
k0 2
∏
i=2
(1  α (ai, xn fa1g))
< 1  αβ  (1  α) β2
0BBB@
k0 2
∑
i=2
α (ai, xn fa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
 
1  α
 
aj, xn fa1g

+α (ak0 1, xn fa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
 
1  α
 
aj, xn fa1g

1CCCA
, (1  α) β2
k0 2
∏
i=2
(1  α (ai, xn fa1g))
< 1  αβ  (1  α) β2
 
k0 2
∑
i=2
α (ai, xn fa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
 
1  α
 
aj, xn fa1g
!
,
(1 α)β2
k0 2
∏
i=2
(1 α(ai,xnfa1g))
1 αβ (1 α)β2
 
k0 2
∑
i=2
α(ai,xnfa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
(1 α(aj,xnfa1g))
! = α(ak0 1,x)
α(ak0 1,xnfa1g)
< 1
where
α(ak0 1,x)
α(ak0 1,xnfa1g)
< 1 holds by the inductive hypothesis on k. Thus, condition (11)
holds.
Case 3: xn fa1g  x. Then a1  x  ? and A2 imply that there exists a unique
α 2 (0, 1) with
x  αa1 + (1  α)?.
Applying Independence repeatedly, the above and xn fa1g  x imply that, for all β 2
[0, 1],
x  β (αa1 + (1  α)?) + (1  β) xn fa1g
so that by the inductive hypothesis
x  αβa1 + (1  β)
 
α (a2, xn fa1g) a2 + ...+
K 1
∏
i=2
(1  α (ai, xn fa1g)) α (aK, xn fa1g) aK
!
+β (1  α)?+ (1  β)
K
∏
i=2
(1  α (ai, xn fa1g))? (12)
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Fix β so that β 2 (0, 1). Then, similarly to case 2, with α and β so defined condition (6)
(with the stated properties on the coefficients) holds by setting recursively
α (a1, x) = αβ (13)
α (ak, x) =
(1  β)
k 1
∏
i=2
(1  α (ai, xn fa1g))
1  αβ  (1  β)
 
k 1
∑
i=2
α (ai, xn fa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
 
1  α
 
aj, xn fa1g
!α (ak, xn fa1g)
A straightforward adaptation of Step 2 and Step 3 in the proof of case 2 shows
that α (ak, x) 2 (0, 1) for all k = 1, ...K. To see that (13) retrieves the coefficients in (6)
correctly, again a straightforward adaptation of the proof of Step 1 in case 2 shows that
the product α (ak, x)
k 1
∏
i=1
(1  α (ai, x)) is a telescoping product, yielding
α (ak, x)
k 1
∏
i=1
(1  α (ai, x)) = (1  β)
k 1
∏
i=2
(1  α (ai, xn fa1g))
namely the coefficient of ak in the lottery on the right hand side of (6).
A.2 Example 1
Let X = fa, bg, suppose that preferences satisfy A0-A4 and are such that a  b 
fa, bg  fag  fbg, and suppose that u represents preferences with
X [ X a b fa, bg fag fbg ?
u () U pU qpU rU sU 0
where U > 0, p, q, r, s 2 (0, 1) and s < r < qp. Since α (a, fag)U = u (fag) = rU and
α (b, fbg) pU = u (fbg) = sU we determine the parameters
α (a, fag) = r
α (b, fbg) =
s
p
The other constraint is
α (a,X)U + (1  α (a,X)) α (b,X) pU = u (X) = qpU
, α (b,X) =
qp  α (a,X)
(1  α (a,X)) p
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Since α (b,X) 2 (0, 1), it must be that
qp  α (a,X)
(1  α (a,X)) p
2 (0, 1), α (a,X) < qp
(observing that the numerator is less than the denominator if and only if (q  1) p <
(1  p) α (a,X), which holds true always). Moreover, since the monotonicity condition
on α imposes that α (b,X)  α (b, fbg), it must also be
qp  α (a,X)
(1  α (a,X)) p

s
p
, α (a,X) 
qp  s
1  s
In short, then, we have the restriction
α (a,X) 2

qp  s
1  s
, qp

A.3 An example of the effect of ˆ on the attention function
Let X = fa, bg, a  b  fa, bg  fag  fbg, with u representing these preferences and
defined as
X [ X a b fa, bg fag fbg ?
u () U U pU pqU pqU 0
with U > 0, p, q 2 (0, 1).
Since α (a, fag)U = u (fag) = u (fbg) = α (b, fbg)U = pqU we determine the
parameters α (a, fag) = pq = α (b, fbg). The other constraint is
α (a,X)U + (1  α (a,X)) α (b,X)U = u (X) = pU
, α (b,X) =
p  α (a,X)
1  α (a,X)
(14)
with α (a,X) < p to ensure α (b,X) > 0.
Suppose first that aˆb. As in example 1, since the monotonicity condition on α
requires that α (b,X)  α (b, fbg), it must also be
p  α (a,X)
1  α (a,X)
 pq, α (a, fa, bg) 
p (1  q)
1  pq
In short, then, we have α (a, fa, bg) 2
h
p(1 q)
1 pq , p

6= ? and α (b,X) = p α(a,X)1 α(a,X) .
Now consider the alternative case bˆa. As the two attention parameters α (a,X)
and α (b,X) are completely symmetric, we obtain α (b,X) 2
h
p(1 q)
1 pq , p

and α (a,X) =
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p α(b,X)
1 α(b,X) , α (b,X) =
p α(a,X)
1 α(a,X) . That is, while equation (14) establishes the same condi-
tion regardless of whether aˆb or bˆa, the monotonicity condition imposes a different
range of values for the attention parameters. For instance, setting p = 0.6 and q = 0.8,
α (a,X) = 0.2 and α (b,X) = 0.5, the requirements for the case aˆb fail (since for that
case α (a,X) 2 [0.23, 0.6)) while those for bˆa hold (since 0.5 = α (b,X) 2 [0.23, 0.6)
and α (a,X) = 0.6 0.51 0.5 = 0.2).
More in general, for any ε 2 (0,min f1  p, p (1  q)g), the case aˆb allows for
α (a,X) = p  ε and α (b,X) = p (p ε)1 (p ε) =
ε
1 p+ε > 0; since however
ε
1 p+ε <
p(1 q)
1 pq
given our condition on ε, this value falls outside the range for α (b,X) when bˆa.
Finally, we note that taking e.g. the case aˆb, if we also required α (a,X)  α (a, fag) =
pq, we would have
p (1  q)
1  pq
< pq,
1  q
1  pq
< q, 1  2q+ pq2 < 0
, p <
2q  1
q2
If q is sufficiently small, the rhs in the last inequality is negative, so that the condition
cannot hold. For instance with U = 12, p = 14 and q =
1
3 so that utilities are u (?) = 0,
u (a) = u (b) = 12 > 0, u (fa, bg) = 3, u (fag) = 1 = u (fbg). Then α (a, fag) =
α (b, fbg) = 112 , while from
u (X) = 3 = α (a,X) 12+ (1  α (a,X)) α (b,X) 12
we obtain
α (b,X) =
1  4α (a,X)
4 (1  α (a,X))
which is positive since by monotonicity it must be α (a,X)  α (a, fag) = 112 <
1
4 . On
the other hand, since by monotonicity we must also have α (b,X)  112 , it follows that
1  4α (a,X)
4 (1  α (a,X))

1
12
, α (a,X) 
2
11
>
1
12
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